EU General Court awards compensation for its own unreasonable delays in cartel cases

Spotlight
15 March 2017

The General Court ruled on four damages claims which were introduced because it had failed to decide within a reasonable period of time in four appeals against cartel fines. Three companies were granted modest compensation; a fourth claim was dismissed.

The four cases followed the same path: the companies were fined by the EU Commission in 2005 and 2006 respectively for their participation in a cartel, and they subsequently brought an appeal before the General Court. It was not until 2011 that the General Court rendered a judgment, no less than 5 years and 9 months (for Kendrion, Gascogne and ASPLA) and 4 years and 3 months (for Aalberts) after the appeal had been lodged. In each case an appeal against the judgment of the General Court was lodged before the Court of Justice, which rendered its judgments in the autumn of 2013.

In the proceedings before the Court of Justice, Kendrion and Gascogne argued that their case had not been examined by the General Court within a reasonable period of time and that, as a sanction, the fine imposed should be annulled or reduced. An old precedent pointed in that direction. However, with reference to a more recent precedent, the Court held that exceeding the reasonable period of time could be remedied by bringing a claim for compensation before the General Court (with a different composition from the one that had ruled on the merits). Kendrion, Gascogne, ASPLA and Aalberts introduced such claims.

The first requirement for obtaining damages is that "a sufficiently serious breach of a rule of law that is intended to confer rights on individuals" has been demonstrated, such as failure to adjudicate within a reasonable period of time (Article 47, second paragraph of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights). The General Court ruled that, in competition cases, 15 months between the end of the written procedure and the opening of the oral procedure would be appropriate, extended by one additional month per parallel appeal against the same Commission decision. In the case of Kendrion, Gascogne and ASPLA, it was held that their proceedings had not been dealt with within a reasonable period of time, as the General Court had been unjustifiably inactive for 20 months in the period between the end of the written procedure and the opening of the oral procedure. In the case of Aalberts, no unjustifiably inactive period and hence no sufficiently serious breach was found.

The second condition is that the damage must be actual and certain. Both material harm (e.g. the costs of a bank guarantee related to the fine imposed pending the appeal) and non-material harm (e.g. reputation or uncertainty regarding the outcome of the proceedings) qualify for compensation. In any event, only the damage resulting from the failure to adjudicate within a reasonable period of time is eligible for compensation, which means that a causal link between the breach and the damage must be demonstrated (the third condition). The General Court held, for example, that uncertainty about the outcome of proceedings is inherent in any legal procedure, whereas failure to adjudicate within a reasonable period of time leads to a situation of uncertainty that goes beyond the usual uncertainty. This inevitably has an influence on the planning of decisions to be taken and on the management of the companies.

These damages claims constituted an incentive for the General Court to request a significant increase in the number of judges.